Abstract. In this paper we present several new potentially weak (pairs of) keys for DES, LOKI89 and LOKI91.
Introduction
In this paper we consider DES-like iterative ciphers in particular the DES 5] and the LOKI ciphers, LOKI'89 2] and LOKI' 91 3] . In these ciphers the ciphertext is calculated by recursively applying a round function to the plaintext. We expect the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of di erential cryptanalysis and refer to 1, 7] for further details.
In this paper we show how to use the 'di erential techniques' to nd new classes of weak keys for DES-like iterated ciphers. We found several pairs of keys, quasi weak keys, for which there exist a simple relation between the DESpermutations induced by pairs of keys. Furthermore we de ne weak hash keys for DES-like iterated ciphers and show several of these for the LOKI ciphers.
DES
The F-function of the DES is de ned F(K i ; R i?1 ) = P(S(E(R i?1 ) K i )), where E is an expansion of 32 bits to 48 bits, S consist of 8 S-boxes each substituting a 6 bit value by a 4 bit value, P is a permutation of 32 bits and K i is a 48-bit round key derived from a key schedule algorithm. In 6] it is shown that to have equal outputs of the F-function with two di erent inputs using the same key, the inputs must be di erent in the inputs to at least 3 neighboring S-boxes. We state here a converse result, i.e. Lemma 1 (DES) There exist pairs of round keys di erent in the inputs to only one S-box, s.t. using the same (text)input, equal outputs of the F-function are obtained.
Proof: Because the keys are added to the input after the expansion, they do not (automatically) a ect neighboring S-boxes. 2 Furthermore there exist many pairs of 48 bit keys K i and K 0 i di erent in the inputs to only one S-box, s.t. equal inputs lead to equal outputs in one round of encryption.
We can use Lemma 1 to nd what we will call quasi weak keys for DES.
Quasi weak keys for DES
According to Shannons concept of di usion, there should be no simple relation between the two functions DES K ( ) and DES K ( ) for any two keys K and K . The well-known exceptions are the weak and semi-weak keys, a total of 16 for DES. We show that for several other pairs of keys for the DES there exists a simple relation between the encryption functions, at least for a fraction of all plaintexts.
The key schedule of the DES. The For these pairs of keys we found that there is some connection between the two encryption functions de ned by the pair. In the following i and j denote 32 bit values. For every pair f i ; j g a probability p i;j is connected. Theorem 3 (DES) Let K and K be a pair of keys from Th. 2. Then for all plaintexts, P, there exist a pair f i ; j g and a probability p i;j , s.t. with P = P L k P R and P = P R i k P L F(
with probability p i;j . Furthermore for the pairs of keys of Th. 2 X i;j p i;j = 1
Proof: Let K and K be a pair of keys from Th. 2. Choose a random plaintext P = P L k P R . Encrypt P using K obtaining C = C L k C R = DES(K; P). Let the right half of P be P L F(K 1 ; P R ). The right half inputs (before addition of the keys) to the second round of DES(K; P) and the rst round of DES(K ; P ) are equal. Let the di erence in the round keys be K 2;1 = K 2 K 1 . That is, the di erence in the inputs to the S-boxes of respectively the second and rst round is K 2;1 .
It is now easy from the 'pairs xor table' of DES to nd a possible xor of the outputs of the respective rounds. Denote the outputs and , and de ne = ; the corresponding probability from the xor table is denoted p . Now let the left half of P be P R . Now the right half input to the third round of the encryption with K is P R and the right half of the input to the second round of the encryption with K is P R , i.e. the inputs are equal, since P R P R = 0: The left halves of the inputs to the corresponding rounds are also equal and since the keys are equal from now on and until the 16'th and 15'th round respectively, according to Theorem 2, it follows that the two encryptions are the same until the last and second last round respectively. For these rounds the right half of the inputs are equal and the xor of keys is K 16;15 = K 16 K 15 . Let denote a possible xor of the outputs with input xor K 16;15 and the corresponding probability p . Now the implication in ( 1) holds with probability p ; = p p . To complete the proof we notice that for a given plaintext there is only one value for and above and that for all plaintexts there are only a limited number of choices for and , which depend on the keys (K; K ) and they can easily be identi ed using the 'pairs xor table'. 2 Example 1. Let K = 4020 0000 1080 9080 x and K = 0000 0080 9080 9080 x in hexadecimal notation, this pair is one of the pairs from Th. 2. The connection between the round keys of the pair is as follows. K i = K i+1 for i = 2; ::; 14 and K 1 K 2 = 00 x ; 20 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x K 15 K 16 = 05 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x ; 00 x where we have arranged the key bits in 8 groups of 6 bits each (hex). From the 'pairs xor table' of DES we nd that for S-box 2, there are 9 possible xor of the outputs with an input xor 20 x . The most likely xor of the outputs is C x , which has probability 14 64 . Let 1 = P(0C000000 x ), where P is the 32-bit permutation at the end of the F-function, and denote the probability p 1 . Similarly, we nd that there are 14 possible xors of the outputs with an input xor 05 x for S-box 1. The most likely xor of the outputs is (again) C x , which has probability 12 64 . Let 1 = P(C0000000 x ) and denote the probability p 1 . With i = 1 and j = 1 the implication in (1) Since this phenomenon is due to only the xor of some round keys of K and K , a similar result holds for the complemented pairs of keys K and K .
For all pairs of keys, K and K from Th. 1, K 9 6 = K 8 except for the 256 pairs of keys of Th. 2. As shown above the input to the ninth round for encryption with K and the input to the eighth round for encryption with K will be equal with some probability . That means that the inputxor for the two encryptions will be (K 9 K 8 ), since the (text)inputs are equal. For about 2 48:7 pairs of keys K and K , the input xor (K 9 K 8 ) will lead to equal outputs for some fraction of all plaintexts. Lemma 1 shows that this is possible for keys that di er in the inputs to only one S-box. For the 2 48:7 pairs of keys this fraction varies from 1 4 to 2 ?39 . Therefore for these keys we have a parallel to Th. 3.
Theorem 4 (DES) For 2 48:7 pairs of keys K and K , it holds that for a fraction p KK of all plaintexts there exist a pair f i ; j g and a probability p i;j , s.t. for P = P L k P R and P = P R i k P L F( We conclude that for many pairs of keys in DES there is a simple relation between the encryption functions induced by these keys. This simple relation corresponds to one round of DES encryption and for 256 pairs of keys it holds for all plaintexts. For other 2 48:7 pairs of keys it holds for a fraction of all plaintexts.
Applications. Since the phenomenon of Th. 3 and Th. 4 holds only for a small subset of keys and for most keys only for a fraction of all plaintexts, it is doubtful that the quasi weak keys can be exploited in attacks on the DES itself. However, DES is often used in hash functions where the keys are xed or can be chosen as part of the (hash) message 9]. In di erential attacks on hash functions based on block ciphers one could nd two plaintexts, s.t. the ( ; )'s of Th. 3 are equal, thereby in a di erential the 's and the rightmost 's in (1) would cancel out. By trying su ciently many pairs of plaintexts useful di erentials (with xed keys) might be found and used in attacks on hash functions.
Weak hash keys
We consider as before DES-like iterated block ciphers. Let the block size of the cipher be m.
De nition 1 A weak hash key K is a key for which P E K (P) = (2) with probability p >> 2 ?m for xed : It is clear that weak hash keys should be avoided in hash modes where the input to the block cipher is added modulo 2 to the output to obtain some kind of one-wayness.
In 4] Coppersmith shows how to nd xpoints for DES used with weak keys, i.e. plaintexts P, s.t. P = DES K (P). For each weak key in DES (and LOKI) there are 2 32 xpoints, therefore a weak key in DES and LOKI is also a weak hash key. Note that the inputs to the eighth and ninth round uniquely determine both the plaintext and ciphertext and that the di erence will be for exactly 2 32 plaintexts. Also note that although equation (2) holds with probability only 2 ?32 for the above keys, the plain-and ciphertexts, for which (2) holds, can be found using only half an encryption, when the key is known. As for the quasi weak keys, once we have found a weak hash key for LOKI (or DES), the complemented key is also a weak hash key. Proof: Let Rol n (X) be X rotated (bitwise) n places to the left and let h be a hex digit, h 2 f0; 3; 5; 6; 9;A; C;Fg: From the key schedule of LOKI'91 it follows that the keys K = K L k K R , where K L = hhhhhhhh x and K R = Rol 3 (K L ) or K R = Rol 3 (K L ) are weak hash keys. Eight of these keys are also either weak or semi-weak 3], but the other eight are neither weak nor semi-weak.
